Fragment from the analytical note of the Case report. June 26.
Television vs Telegram. Among Russians inside the country, a hybrid
model with two centers of gravity remains: television and Telegram. TV remains
the most widespread source by reach (42%) and the main source
of news (28%); Telegram has almost caught up with it in reach (39%) and lags
only slightly as the main source (25%). Among emigrants, this structure
has broken down: media consumption is almost entirely digital, with
Telegram dominating (93% reach; 58% main source) and a strong
role for YouTube (71% reach; 22% main source), while TV
practically disappears (2% reach; 1% main source).
5
2. The different role of Telegram. In Russia, Telegram is one of the two
central channels, but more often in combination with TV, aggregators, and websites. In
emigration, Telegram is no longer just one of the channels, but the basic news
environment. This is also evident from the segmentation: among emigrants, the largest segment is
“Telegram operatives” (42%), for whom Telegram is the main source for 96%. Among Russians, Telegram also plays a systemic role, but
users have not shifted to full Telegram-centricity: a noticeable part of the audience
continues to build their media consumption around television, using
Telegram as a supplement and a rapid source
of information.
3. YouTube as a marker of the difference between the Russian and emigrant
media environments. For Russians inside the country, YouTube remains a relatively
peripheral mass channel (10% reach; 4% main source). For emigrants, it is already the second most important pillar of media consumption (71%
reach; 22% main source). For emigrants, YouTube serves as a platform for long explanatory and analytical content, while
inside Russia this type of consumption is still concentrated in narrower,
younger, and more critically minded groups. In fact, YouTube
most strongly separates the emigrant consumption model from the Russian one:
Telegram solves the task of accessing the news itself, while YouTube solves the task
of interpretation and explanation.
4. The main dividing line within Russia is age. Among the surveyed
Russians, the age gap is very sharp: among young people aged 18–29, Telegram is more often the main
source (46%), while TV plays a minimal role
(6%); among those 60+, the picture is the opposite — TV (54%) and Telegram (8%). Similarly,
education level and degree of urbanization also work this way: among people with
higher education, Telegram as the main source is encountered more often
(30%) than TV (20%), while among people without higher education, the opposite is true: TV (41%)
noticeably outpaces Telegram (19%). In Moscow and St. Petersburg, Telegramcentricity is also above average. In emigration, age no longer creates
such a split: Telegram dominates in almost all groups, including
older ones. That is, inside Russia, generations still strongly
structure media consumption, while in emigration the digital environment partially smooths
out this effect.
5. Different principles of trust formation. Both surveys show
the high importance of Telegram as a trust infrastructure, but the set of
media outlets within it is different. Among Russians, larger and institutionally recognizable channels receive higher
ratings, while among emigrants the trust core is built around independent editorial teams and author-driven sources, and the average ratings for independent channels are high (4.2–4.3). This is not only a difference in
6
preferences, but also a sign of two different principles of trust formation:
inside Russia, institutional recognizability works more strongly,
while in emigration, the reputation of independence and editorial autonomy prevails.
6. A contradictory picture of fact-checking. Despite the fact that
the majority notice different framing of the same news (66% of Russians and 88%
of emigrants), systematic fact-checking remains a niche practice.
Half of the surveyed Russians do not know any ways to verify information, and 48% of
emigrants either do not know them or declined to answer this question. At
the same time, within the critical segment, the practices are better represented: about a third (32%)
“always or almost always” check news.
7. VPN is a marker of media strategy. In the Russian sample, about a quarter of respondents use means
to bypass blocking (24%), while the majority do not (70%). But in reality this is a highly stratified
practice: VPNs are used significantly more often by young people (35% among 18–29), people with
higher education (29%), the well-off (29%), men (29%), Moscow residents (34%), and residents of high-income groups (up to 42% in some
income categories). This makes VPN a good indicator of digital autonomy and willingness to go beyond the accessible platform environment. Among emigrants, the access situation itself is different, so VPN does not
serve as a divider of media consumption.
8. Information fatigue and “gentle” consumption. Among Russians inside
the country, fatigue exists, but is more often expressed in a vague or moderate form: in the
section on desired topics, the majority say they do not need more information on any topics at all (65%).
At the same time, focus groups talk about moving toward “emotionally gentle” content, while in surveys — about
a decline in interest in political and military topics. 15% of surveyed
Russians have become less interested in politics, 13% — in military
actions, whereas among emigrants this figure is significantly higher: 42%
are tired of the war topic, and 32% — of politics in general.
9. Demand for practical value and positivity. In conditions of burnout, the audience
looks for “positive news” (44% of emigrants feel a demand for positive
and good news). Even a critically minded audience among Russians
practices news filtering to preserve calm,
switching from politics to travel blogs and educational content.
A totally negative agenda and “propaganda optimism”
that contradicts everyday experience cause irritation among Russians and a
sense of manipulation.
7
Inside Russia, a hybrid, partly inertial system remains in place, where
television still holds on thanks to age, ritual, and everyday integration, while Telegram becomes the main digital competitor. In
emigration, the system is different: Telegram and YouTube form a full-fledged digital
core, and independent sources create a new regime of trust. At the same time, among
emigrants, analytical video consumption and news fatigue are more pronounced, while among Russians — social segmentation of access, trust, and critical thinking. BLOCK_1:
model with two centers of gravity remains: television and Telegram. TV remains
the most widespread source by reach (42%) and the main source
of news (28%); Telegram has almost caught up with it in reach (39%) and lags
only slightly as the main source (25%). Among emigrants, this structure
has broken down: media consumption is almost entirely digital, with
Telegram dominating (93% reach; 58% main source) and a strong
role for YouTube (71% reach; 22% main source), while TV
practically disappears (2% reach; 1% main source).
5
2. The different role of Telegram. In Russia, Telegram is one of the two
central channels, but more often in combination with TV, aggregators, and websites. In
emigration, Telegram is no longer just one of the channels, but the basic news
environment. This is also evident from the segmentation: among emigrants, the largest segment is
“Telegram operatives” (42%), for whom Telegram is the main source for 96%. Among Russians, Telegram also plays a systemic role, but
users have not shifted to full Telegram-centricity: a noticeable part of the audience
continues to build their media consumption around television, using
Telegram as a supplement and a rapid source
of information.
3. YouTube as a marker of the difference between the Russian and emigrant
media environments. For Russians inside the country, YouTube remains a relatively
peripheral mass channel (10% reach; 4% main source). For emigrants, it is already the second most important pillar of media consumption (71%
reach; 22% main source). For emigrants, YouTube serves as a platform for long explanatory and analytical content, while
inside Russia this type of consumption is still concentrated in narrower,
younger, and more critically minded groups. In fact, YouTube
most strongly separates the emigrant consumption model from the Russian one:
Telegram solves the task of accessing the news itself, while YouTube solves the task
of interpretation and explanation.
4. The main dividing line within Russia is age. Among the surveyed
Russians, the age gap is very sharp: among young people aged 18–29, Telegram is more often the main
source (46%), while TV plays a minimal role
(6%); among those 60+, the picture is the opposite — TV (54%) and Telegram (8%). Similarly,
education level and degree of urbanization also work this way: among people with
higher education, Telegram as the main source is encountered more often
(30%) than TV (20%), while among people without higher education, the opposite is true: TV (41%)
noticeably outpaces Telegram (19%). In Moscow and St. Petersburg, Telegramcentricity is also above average. In emigration, age no longer creates
such a split: Telegram dominates in almost all groups, including
older ones. That is, inside Russia, generations still strongly
structure media consumption, while in emigration the digital environment partially smooths
out this effect.
5. Different principles of trust formation. Both surveys show
the high importance of Telegram as a trust infrastructure, but the set of
media outlets within it is different. Among Russians, larger and institutionally recognizable channels receive higher
ratings, while among emigrants the trust core is built around independent editorial teams and author-driven sources, and the average ratings for independent channels are high (4.2–4.3). This is not only a difference in
6
preferences, but also a sign of two different principles of trust formation:
inside Russia, institutional recognizability works more strongly,
while in emigration, the reputation of independence and editorial autonomy prevails.
6. A contradictory picture of fact-checking. Despite the fact that
the majority notice different framing of the same news (66% of Russians and 88%
of emigrants), systematic fact-checking remains a niche practice.
Half of the surveyed Russians do not know any ways to verify information, and 48% of
emigrants either do not know them or declined to answer this question. At
the same time, within the critical segment, the practices are better represented: about a third (32%)
“always or almost always” check news.
7. VPN is a marker of media strategy. In the Russian sample, about a quarter of respondents use means
to bypass blocking (24%), while the majority do not (70%). But in reality this is a highly stratified
practice: VPNs are used significantly more often by young people (35% among 18–29), people with
higher education (29%), the well-off (29%), men (29%), Moscow residents (34%), and residents of high-income groups (up to 42% in some
income categories). This makes VPN a good indicator of digital autonomy and willingness to go beyond the accessible platform environment. Among emigrants, the access situation itself is different, so VPN does not
serve as a divider of media consumption.
8. Information fatigue and “gentle” consumption. Among Russians inside
the country, fatigue exists, but is more often expressed in a vague or moderate form: in the
section on desired topics, the majority say they do not need more information on any topics at all (65%).
At the same time, focus groups talk about moving toward “emotionally gentle” content, while in surveys — about
a decline in interest in political and military topics. 15% of surveyed
Russians have become less interested in politics, 13% — in military
actions, whereas among emigrants this figure is significantly higher: 42%
are tired of the war topic, and 32% — of politics in general.
9. Demand for practical value and positivity. In conditions of burnout, the audience
looks for “positive news” (44% of emigrants feel a demand for positive
and good news). Even a critically minded audience among Russians
practices news filtering to preserve calm,
switching from politics to travel blogs and educational content.
A totally negative agenda and “propaganda optimism”
that contradicts everyday experience cause irritation among Russians and a
sense of manipulation.
7
Inside Russia, a hybrid, partly inertial system remains in place, where
television still holds on thanks to age, ritual, and everyday integration, while Telegram becomes the main digital competitor. In
emigration, the system is different: Telegram and YouTube form a full-fledged digital
core, and independent sources create a new regime of trust. At the same time, among
emigrants, analytical video consumption and news fatigue are more pronounced, while among Russians — social segmentation of access, trust, and critical thinking. BLOCK_1:
The original text can be read on the website:
It is currently the last one among the reports.
Well, at least the analytical note.
There is also an interview with Case director Dmitry Nekrasov. (recognized as a foreign agent in the Russian Federation).
Again, I am posting what I consider to be a certain semantic reference point in the pile of information.
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